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\begin{document}

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% (Mihir, 11/12/95) I wanted to try to reflect Fractional OT in the title
% as well. I'm not too happy with what I came up with; maybe the original
% title is better after all.

\title{{\LARGE Translucent Cryptography --- An Alternative to Key Escrow, and
its Implementation via Fractional Oblivious Transfer}\thanks{\ An
earlier version of this paper, by the second author, was titled
``Translucent Cryptography:~An Alternative to Key Escrow,'' and was
presented at the Rump session of Crypto~95. Patent pending with
probability $1/2$.}\protect\vspace{0.2in}}

\author{{\sc Mihir Bellare}\thanks{\ Department of Computer Science \& 
Engineering, Mail Code 0114, University of California, San Diego, 9500 
Gilman Drive, 
La Jolla, CA 92093. E-mail: {\tt mihir@\allowbreak cs.ucsd.edu}}
\and
{\sc Ronald L. Rivest}\thanks{\ Laboratory for Computer Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
E-mail: {\tt rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu}}\\
\protect\vspace{0.3in}
}
\date{\today}
\maketitle
\thispagestyle{empty}

\begin{abstract}

We present an alternative to the controversial ``key escrow''
techniques for enabling law-enforcement and national security access
to encrypted communications.

Our proposal allows such access with probability $p$ for each message,
for a parameter $p$ between $0$ and $1$ to be chosen (say, by
Congress) to provide an appropriate balance between concerns for
individual privacy, on the one hand, and the need for such access by
law-enforcement and national security, on the other.  For example,
with $p=0.4$, a law-enforcement agency conducting an authorized
wiretap which records 100 encrypted conversations would expect to be
able to decrypt (approximately) 40 of these conversations; the agency
would not be able to decrypt the remaining 60 conversations at all.

Different values of $p$ can be chosen for different situations, such
as for export. Our proposal can be combined with other ideas, such as
secret-sharing, to provide additional flexibility.  Our scheme is
remarkably simple to implement, as it requires no prior escrowing of
keys.

We provide an efficient implementation of translucent cryptography.
It is based on non-interactive oblivious transfer, as pioneered by
Bellare and Micali \cite{BellareMi90a}, who showed how to transfer a
message with probability $1/2$. We provide means for non-interactive
fractional oblivious transfer, which allows a message to be
transmitted with any given probability $p$.  Our protocol is based on
the Diffie-Hellman assumption and uses just one El Gamal encryption
(two exponentiations), regardless of the value of the transfer
probability $p$.

This makes the implementation of translucent cryptography competitive,
in efficiency of encryption, with current suggestions for software key
escrow such as the fair Diffie-Hellman system \cite{Micali92}, so that
efficiency, at least, is not a barrier to its consideration.

\end{abstract}

\newpage

\section{Introduction}

Our nation is in the midst of an important and critical debate on
cryptographic policy.  The current administration seems committed to
the idea that the government should be able to read encrypted
communications to support law-enforcement or national security
objectives, when appropriately authorized.  (See NIST
\cite{NationalInst94c}.)  This position is highly unpopular with many
(most?) citizens and with much of the business community.

The purpose of this paper is not to contribute to the political debate
directly.  (For the record, the views of the second author are strongly
libertarian.)  The reader is referred to Hoffman \cite{Hoffman95a},
Denning \cite{Denning95}, or Micali \cite{Micali92} for some discussion
of the issues involved.  Rather, our purpose here is contribute as
technologists by pointing out that there are other possible ways we
might try to achieve an appropriate balance between individual privacy
and government access to communications.  Key-escrow is not the only
game in town.  Just as technology can produce or exacerbate a basic
conflict, technology can also provide means for its solution.

\subsection{Translucent cryptography}

This paper introduces a new dimension along which debate can be framed
and compromise can be considered: the probability $p$ with which a
particular message can be decrypted by the government.  A fraction $p$
of the messages sent from a user Alice to a user Bob will be
decryptable by the government, and the remaining $1-p$ fraction will
not be decryptable by the government. (To recover messages from one
user to another, the government would wiretap the communication
between them. Of the recovered messages, it will be able to decrypt a
$p$ fraction.)  Of course, the intended recipient of an encrypted
message can always decrypt it; it is only the government that gets a
``partial view.''  The sender of an encrypted message does not know
whether or not that message will be decryptable by the government.  A
small value of $p$ (say, $p=0.02$) favors a libertarian viewpoint,
while a large value of $p$ (say, $p=0.9$) favors
law-enforcement.

In comparison, we see that debate about key-escrow is a difficult one
because there is no ``middle ground'': either the government has
access (if the keys are escrowed) or it does not (if the keys are not
escrowed).  With our proposal, values of $p$ strictly between $0$ and
$1$ form a ``middle ground'' where each side of the debate has some
gain, and some loss.  A value of $p$ can be chosen that balances the
relative concerns.  Congress might pick the appropriate $p$.  

The scheme is called ``translucent'' because it explores the space
between ``opaque'' (strong encryption with no key escrow) and
``transparent'' (no encryption or encryption with key
escrow).\footnote{Other adjectives we considered instead of ``translucent''
were ``variable-opacity,'' ``fractional-access,'' ``partial-access,''
and ``probabilistic-access.'' Translucent seemed the simplest choice.}
With our translucent scheme, the government can decrypt {\em some} of
the messages, but not all.  Just as a translucent door on a shower
stall provides some privacy, but not perfect privacy, translucent
crypto provides some communications privacy, but not perfect privacy.
In our scheme the degree of ``translucency'' can be controlled by
varying $p$.

The value of $p$ does not even need to be fixed once and for all, nor
need it be the same for each kind of encryption equipment.  The value
of $p$ might be chosen small today (say $p=0.02$), and increased or
reduced later as judged appropriate.  Or, one could have one value of
$p$ for cellular phones and a different one for email encryption
programs.  Or, a larger value of $p$ could be used in export versions
of programs than is used for domestic versions.  The value of $p$ used
is built into the encrypting device or program.  It is possible for
the government to measure the effective value of $p$ used by an
encrypting device or program, and so to monitor compliance with the
overall scheme.

Because a criminal does not know which messages are decryptable and
which are not, he runs the risk every time he uses encryption
that this particular message will be decrypted and will be used
against him.

Our proposal also has the advantage, compared to key-escrow
techniques, that there is practically no ``set-up'' required.  Users and
manufacturers do not need to register or escrow their cryptographic
key information.  More specifically, a manufacturer of cryptographic
circuits does not have to secretly manufacture, record, and deliver to
escrow agents the secret keys of each chip, as is the case for the
``Clipper chip.''  Indeed, the chips can be all made identically in a
non-secret manner.  Analogously, there is no need for users of
public-key cryptosystems to submit their private keys for escrowing;
their private keys remain forever their own secrets.  These are
consequences of the fact that our scheme discloses only the message or
session key to the government, not the long-term keys of the devices
or of the users.  The only set-up required is for the government to 
publish a list of public keys, and for Congress to pick 
an appropriate value(s) for $p$.

This proposal can combined with previously-known techniques to achieve
other objectives, such as requiring more than one government agency to
cooperate before any messages can be decrypted, or limiting the
effective time period of a wire-tap warrant.

This proposal is hardly perfect.  One can object to it on many fronts,
both political (the ``other side'' of the debate gets to win a little, and
could win more later if $p$ changes) and technical (like key escrow, our
scheme is easy to subvert by techniques such as double-encryption).  

Nonetheless, this proposal will serve its purpose if it opens our
imaginations a bit, enlarges our sense of the possible, and helps to
bring a difficult national debate closer to a resolution we can all
live with.

\subsection{Fractional oblivious transfer}

We suggest an implementation of translucent cryptography based on an
implementation of {\em non-interactive fractional oblivious transfer.}
The resulting translucent scheme is as efficient, in terms of
encryption, as current suggestions for software key escrow.
Specifically, we need one El Gamal encryption (two exponentiations),
which is the same as the cost of encryption in the Diffie-Hellman
system.

Our implementation is based on the non-interactive oblivious transfer
primitive of \cite{BellareMi90a}. We extend their scheme, which
achieves transfer probability $1/2$, to achieve transfer probability
any fraction $p\in[0,1]$, at no added encryption cost.

In any suggestion for technical solutions to the policy debate we have
been discussing, efficiency is a key issue. Although a scheme cannot,
of course, stand on efficiency alone, it can certainly fail due to its
inefficiency. By providing an implementation of translucent
cryptography which is competitive, in encryption efficiency, with
implementations of key escrow, we have surmounted at least the first
barrier to its discussion.

Furthermore, we suggest that our implementations of fractional 
oblivious transfer, described in \secref{sec-fot}, may be of 
independent interest.

We stress that our implementation of translucent cryptography based on
non-interactive oblivious transfer will not incur any ``extra flows.''
When Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, her only transmission is to
Bob. (In particular, she doesn't communicate on-line with the
government.)  If the government wants to know something about what
Alice is saying to Bob, it must wiretap their communications, and then
it will be able to decrypt a fraction $p$ of the messages it picks up.

\section{Non-interactive oblivious transfer}

Since our proposal uses non-interactive oblivious transfer techniques, we
give the background for and sketch this technology in this section.

Rabin \cite{Rabin81} was the first to introduce the notion of {\em
oblivious transfer}, in which one party (Alice) can transfer a message
to another party (Larry\footnote{We explain the cast of characters:
Alice and Bob are citizens, who may or may not be up to something.
Larry works for a law-enforcement agency.})  in such a way that:
\begin{itemize}
\item Larry receives the message with probability exactly $1/2$.
\item Alice does not know whether Larry received the message or not---that is,
she is {\em oblivious} as to whether the transfer was successful or not.
\end{itemize}
Rabin introduced the notion of oblivious transfer to help solve the
problem of ``exchanging secrets,'' a problem also studied by Blum
\cite{Blum83}.

Protocols for oblivious transfer have been studied by Even, Goldreich,
and Lempel \cite{EvenGoLe83,EvenGoLe85}, Fischer, Micali, and Rackoff
\cite{FischerMR84}, Berger, Peralta, and Tedrick \cite{BergerPeTe85},
Cr\'epeau \cite{Crepeau88}, and others
\cite{Kilian88,e90:denboer,a91:hl,e92:beaver}.  These protocols are
{\em interactive}: they require the recipient, Larry, to actively
participate in the protocol by sending messages to Alice.  For our
purposes, we need the oblivious transfer to be {\em non-interactive}:
Larry should not have to send any messages in order to receive Alice's
message with probability one-half.  With non-interactive oblivious
transfer, Larry needs merely to receive (or overhear) Alice's message
in order to decrypt it with probability one-half.

The first non-interactive oblivious transfer protocol is due to Bellare and 
Micali \cite{BellareMi90a}. Further protocols were given by De Santis and 
Persiano \cite{e90:desantis} and De Santis, Di Crescenzo and Persiano 
\cite{DeSantisDP95}.

To make this paper concrete and self-contained, we describe the
simplest proposal made by Bellare and Micali for implementing
non-interactive oblivious transfer.  Our proposal does not depend on
the details of how non-interactive oblivious transfer is implemented,
however, so that other implementation techniques may be used.  The
rest of this section may be skipped by those not familiar with number
theory or those not wishing to get involved in the mathematical
details.

An initial {\em global set-up phase} establishes the following three
public values:
\begin{itemize}
\item a large global prime $q$ (say at least 1024 bits in length), 
\item a generator $g$ of the multiplicative group $Z_q^*$, and 
\item a value $U$ such that no one knows the discrete logarithm of $U$
(base $g$, modulo $q$).  More precisely, computing $U$'s discrete
logarithm should be computationally infeasible for anyone.
\end{itemize}
We denote the global prime as $q$, since we are already using $p$ to stand for
something else.  Bellare and Micali suggest ways that values for $q$,
$g$, and $U$ could be chosen. In our application, perhaps the ACLU
could choose these values.

The second phase is {\em publication of public keys}.  Like the global
set-up phase, this phase needs to be done only once, no matter how
many oblivious transfers will be performed.  Larry publishes a pair of
values $(V,V')$, where $V'=VU$, as his public key pair.
Larry should know either the discrete logarithm of $V$, or the discrete
logarithm of $V'$; he cannot know both.  We say that $V$
is a {\em good key} (for Larry) if Larry knows the discrete logarithm
of $V$, otherwise we say that $V$ is a {\em bad key} (for Larry).

Can Larry cheat by publishing two public keys $V$ and $V'$ that are both
good for him?
If it is indeed the case that
computing the discrete logarithm of $U$ is computationally infeasible,
then Larry can not successfully cheat, since anyone can check that
$V'=UV$, and thus if both $V$ and $V'$ are good for Larry, Larry
could easily compute the discrete logarithm of $U$:
\[
	\log(U) = \log(V') - \log(V) \pmod{q-1}\ .
\]
Thus only one of the two public keys Larry published is good for
Larry; he knows the discrete logarithm of only one of these keys.

In the final {\em communication phase}, we suppose now that Alice wishes to
obliviously send Larry a message $s\in Z_q^*$.  (We use $s$ to denote the
message, since later $s$ will denote a session key in Alice's
conversation with Bob.)  Alice can do so by picking one of Larry's two
public keys at random, and encrypting $s$ using that public key and
the ElGamal encryption algorithm \cite{ElGamal85}, as follows 
(supposing that $V$ was picked):
\begin{itemize}
\item Alice picks a value $y$ from $\{0,1,\ldots,q-2\}$ uniformly at random,
and sends Larry the ciphertext 
\[
	E(s,V) = (c_1,c_2) = (g^y, sV^y)\ .
\]
(All values computed modulo $q$.)
\item If (and only if) Larry knows the discrete logarithm $x$ of $V$, he
can compute $s$:
\[ s = c_2/c_1^x \pmod{q}\ . \]
\end{itemize}
Thus, Larry receives $s$ with probability exactly $1/2$, since only
one of his two public keys is good.  The protocol is oblivious since
Alice doesn't know which of Larry's keys is good.

Note that this protocol is non-interactive. Also note encryption takes
two exponentiations. This is the same as in the Diffie-Hellman public
key system. (There, Bob would have public key $V=g^x$ and private key
$x$, and Alice would send him a message $s$ by sending $E(s,V)$.)

The above protocol differs in presentation and inessential minor respects from
that proposed by Bellare and Micali; see their paper \cite{BellareMi90a}
for other methods and discussion.

It is important to note that successive oblivious transfers are not
independent: if Alice sends two successive messages using Larry's
public key $V$, Larry either receives them both or receives neither of
them.  This property of non-interactive OT has often been pointed out
in the literature, and has relevance to our application, as discussed
later.

\section{Translucent Cryptography}\label{sec-tc}

In the previous section we have explained how non-interactive
oblivious transfer can be achieved, where the probability is $p=1/2$
that Larry receives the message.  In the next section, section~\ref{sec-fot},
we explain how
to achieve non-interactive {\em fractional} oblivous transfer can be
acheived, where a wide range probabities $p$ can be implemented.
Before diving into the mathematics required to implement
non-interactive fractional oblivous transfer, however, we explain 
in this section how
non-interactive fractional oblivious transfer can be used to implement
translucent cryptography.  This is rather straightforward.  The reader
should, for the moment, accept our promise that we will explain how to
implement non-interactive fractional oblivious transfer with a variety
of values for $p$; this promise will be kept in section~\ref{sec-fot}.

Assume that a probability $p$ has been determined, and that the global
quantities needed to set-up the non-interactive fractional oblivious
transfer have been determined.\footnote{For the schemes described in
section~\ref{sec-fot}, these quantities are denoted $q$, $g$, and $U$
if one is using the binary scheme, or $G$, $g$ and $U$ if one is using
the polynomial scheme, where no one can feasibly compute the discrete
logarithm of $U$ to the base $g$.} We also assume that Larry (the
government) has published his public key(s), again according to the
algorithm specified by whichever scheme we are using. Thus he can
obtain a message sent via oblivious transfer with probability $p$.

The above computation and publication by Larry is the {\em only}
set-up required by our translucent cryptography scheme; there is no
need for each user to escrow shares of his private key, or for
manufacturers to escrow shares of keys stored in each cryptographic
device produced.  Each cryptographic product can be made in an
identical manner, embodying the quantities just described.  In
practice, each product would also presumably have a unique identifying
serial number, so that its messages can be distinguished from those of
other products.  This number does not need to be secret.

How can a user Alice now send a message $M$ in encrypted form to
another user Bob, in such a way that Larry (who is authorized to
eavesdrop on the message) can decrypt it with probability $p$?

First, Alice determines a ``message key'' (or ``session key'') key $s$
in an arbitrary manner.  The key $s$ might, for example, be freshly
generated, or might be the result of a prior agreement between Alice
and Bob. Then, Alice computes, as a function of Larry's key, a string
$L$ which comprises the message she would send to transfer $s$ to
Larry under the $p$-NFOT scheme in use. (For example, if we are using
the polynomial scheme of section~\ref{sec-fot} and Larry's public key
is $(V_1,\ldots,V_m,W_0,\ldots,W_a$) then Alice picks $i\in [m]$ at
random and lets $L= E(s,V_i)$.) Now, Alice transmits a message to Bob
consisting of the following fields:
\begin{namelist}{F}
\item The encryption of message $M$ using a standard algorithm (e.g. DES)
      and the message key~$s$.
\item Information, if necessary, that allows Bob to determine 
      what secret message key $s$ is being used. 
\item The string $L$ she computed above.
\end{namelist}
The third field, namely $L$, is the ``LEAF'' (Law Enforcement Access
Field).  With probability $p$ this information allows Larry to
determine the message key $s$, and thus to decrypt the first field to
obtain the message $m$. 

The second field would typically consist of the encryption of $s$ under Bob's
public key, as is done for example in Privacy Enhanced Mail
\cite{Kent93}.  Bob can reliably decrypt this field to obtain $s$, and thus
to decrypt the first field to obtain the message $m$.  In a variation,
the session key $s$ would be encrypted in a DES key known only to
Alice and Bob.  Or, this information might consist of a message that
can be used in a Diffie-Hellman key-agreement protocol to establish
$s$.  There are a variety of methods by which Alice can let Bob know
what $s$ is, any of which can be used in our scheme.  

The message might also contain the identifying serial number of Alice's
cryptographic product.  This could be in the clear, or be part of the
information transferred obliviously to Larry in the third field.

To clarify this transmission, we stress that $L$ is not sent to Larry;
it is sent to Bob. Larry obtains it only if he wiretaps the line 
between Alice and Bob. There is no direct communication from Alice
to Larry at any time.

We note that Bob can verify that Alice is following the translucent
cryptography protocol properly, by checking that the LEAF is properly
constructed.  In this way a correct implementation can refuse to work
with ``rogue'' implementations that do not build proper LEAF's.

This completes our description of the basic translucent cryptography
protocol.

\section{Non-interactive Fractional Oblivious Transfer}\label{sec-fot}

We call an oblivious transfer scheme {\em fractional\/} if the
probability $p$ that Larry successfully receives the message may be
chosen to be different from $1/2$.  The only previous literature on
fractional oblivious transfer schemes that we know of is by Brassard
et al. \cite{BrassardCR86}, who discuss the special case of
transferring one message out of a set of $n$ messages.  We now explain
how to achieve non-interactive fractional oblivious transfer schemes
for a variety of values for $p$.

Let's say that a $p$-NFOT is a Non-Interactive Fractional Oblivious
Transfer protocol in which the transfer probability is $p$. Our goal
is to design such protocols for given values of the probability $p\in
[0,1]$. We begin by noting simple solutions for certain values of
$p$. Then we move on to the general case, and present two protocols.

\subsection{Some simple special cases}

\headingg{A one out of $n$ NFOT.} To obtain a simple form of fractional
capability, it is easy to modify the basic scheme discussed above to
provide ``one of $n$'' capability non-interactively. (That is, given
$n$, we can design a $p$-NFOT with $p=1/n$.) First, for technical
reasons, we would work not over $Z_q^*$ but over a multiplicative
group of $G$ of prime order $q$.\footnote{\ The order of $Z_q^*$ is
$q-1$ which is not prime. For more on groups of prime order, refer
ahead to
\secref{sec-polyfot} where we use them again.}  As before, $g$ is a
generator (now of $G$) and $U\in G$ is such that $\log_g(U)$ is both
unknown and infeasible for anyone to compute. Larry publishes a list
of values $(V_0, V_1, \ldots, V_{n-1})$ such that $V_i = V_0 U^i$, in
such a way that only one of these keys is good for Larry. (See below
for how.)  Alice checks that indeed $V_i=V_0U^i$ for $i=0,\ldots,n-1$,
then picks one of Larry's public keys at random, and uses it to
encrypt the message to be sent to him.

To make his key, Larry picks $x\in Z_q$ at random and $i\in\{0,\ldots,
n-1\}$ at random. He sets $V_i=g^x$, and then sets $V_j=V_iU^{j-i}$ 
for $j\neq i$. One can check that $V_j=V_0U^j$ for all $j=0,\ldots,
n-1$.

On the other hand, no matter how Larry makes his key, he cannot know
the discrete logs of two (or more) members of the list of group
elements which comprises his key. For, say, he knew $x_i,x_j$ such
that $V_i=g^{x_i}$ and $V_j=g^{x_j}$ where $0\leq i<j<n$. Dividing, we
see that $U^{j-i}=g^{x_j-x_i}$. It follows that $\log_g(U)$ can be
computed, as $\log_g(U)=(j-i)^{-1}(x_j-x_i)\bmod q$, where
$(j-i)^{-1}$ represents the multiplicative inverse of $j-i$ in the
field $Z_q$. (It is to ensure this inverse exists that we work in a
group of prime order.)

\heading{A $n-1$ out of $n$ NFOT.} Similarly for any $n$ it is easy to
obtain a $p$-NFOT with $p=(n-1)/n$.  Larry publishes a list of values
$(V_0,V_1,\ldots,V_{n-1})$ such that $\prod_{i=0}^nV_i = U$, in such a
way that $n-1$ of these keys are good for Larry.  (This is easy for
Larry to do; the details are omitted here.)  Alice checks the product
constraint, then picks one of Larry's public keys at random, and uses
it to encrypt the message to be sent to him.  The product constraint
implies that Larry cannot know the discrete logs of all the keys, so
the transfer probability is $(n-1)/n$.

\heading{Arbitrary $p$.} Now our goal is to accomplish $p$-NFOT for an
arbitrary, given value of $p\in [0,1]$. We would like, ideally, to be
as efficient as the above schemes, and use just one encryption. We
do not accomplish this in our first scheme, the binary scheme of
\secref{sec-binfot} below,~where we use a number of
encryptions proportional to the number of bits in the binary
expansion of $p$.  Then in \secref{sec-polyfot} we present another
scheme which requires only one encryption.

\subsection{The binary scheme}\label{sec-binfot}

Here is a way to extend the basic scheme to get a fractional scheme
where the probability $p$ can be any finite binary fraction $p=a/2^n$,
where $a$ is an integer in the range $1$ to $2^n-1$.  (The cases $p=0$
and $p=1$ can be easily handled without any oblivious transfer; for
$p=1$ Alice merely needs to encrypt $s$ with an additional public key
known to be good for Larry.) In this solution Alice will use a number
of encryptions depending on $p$ to accomplish the transfer.
(Specifically, $2n$ encryptions, which is $4n$ exponentiations.)

Let the $n$-bit binary expansion of $p = a/2^n = 0.a_1a_2\ldots a_n$, 
so that
\[
	p = \ssum{i=1}{n} a_i 2^{-i}\ . \label{eq:pdef}
\]
We assume the values of $n$, $a$, and $p$ are public knowledge, as
are $q$, $g$, and $U$---the global set-up phase is the same as above.

\heading{Key setup.} In the publication of public keys phase, Larry publishes 
a sequence of $n$ pairs of public keys:
\[
  (V_1,V_1'), (V_2,V_2'),\ldots,(V_n,V_n')\ ,
\]
where exactly one key in each pair is good for Larry.  For each $i$,
$1\le i\le n$, Larry privately flips a coin to determine whether
$V_i$ or $V'_i$ will be good for him, and proceeds to
generate the $i$-th pair of keys as follows. 
If the $i$-th coin flip is ``heads,'' he 
first randomly picks a $x_i$ between $0$ and $q-2$, and sets
\[
	(V_i,V_i') = (g^{x_i}, Ug^{x_i})\ ,
\]
so that he knows the logarithm $x_i$ of $V_i$.
Otherwise he randomly picks a $x'_i$ between $0$ and $q-2$, and sets
\[
	(V_i,V_i') = (g^{x'_i}/U, g^{x'_i})\ ,
\]
so that he knows the logarithm $x'_i$ of $V_i'$.  Note that $V_i' =
U V_i$ in either case, which can be checked by anyone.  Of course,
Larry should not tell anyone which public keys are good for him.

\heading{Transfer.} In the communication phase, Alice can
non-interactively and obliviously transfer a message $s$ to Larry so
that he receives it with probability $p$, as follows.  This will
require sending a sequence of $n$ triples
\[
	T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n
\]
to Larry, where each triple contains two values encrypted with Larry's
keys $V_i$ and $V_i'$.  (In our application, we imagine that $n$
probably need not be larger than about five to obtain satisfactory
precision in the value of $p$, so that this sequence is actually quite
short.)

First, Alice chooses a sequence of $n$ keys $K_1$, $K_2$, \ldots,
$K_n$ as random values modulo $q$, and computes their running
sums:
\begin{eqnarray*}
L_0 & = & 0, \hbox{~and~} \\
L_i & = & K_1 + K_2 + \ldots + K_i \pmod{q}, \hbox{~for~} i = 1,2,\ldots,n\ .
\end{eqnarray*}
She also determines a value $J_i$ for each $i$, $1\le i \le n$: 
\[
	J_i = \cases{
			0	             & \cif{a_i = 0}, \\
			s + L_{i-1} \pmod{q} & \cif{a_i=1}\ . 
		     }
\]
Each $J_i$ is either ``junk'' ($0$, if $a_i=0$) or a ``jewel'' ($s+L_{i-1}$,
if $a_i=1$).

Second, Alice chooses a sequence of $n$ ``random'' bits $r_1$, $r_2$,
\ldots, $r_n$.  (We will return to the question as to how Alice
might generate these bits later.)

Finally, Alice sends Larry a sequence of $n$ triples, where the
$i$-th triple $T_i$, for $1\le i\le n$, contains $r_i$ and 
the encrypted versions of $J_i$ and $K_i$, and where the encryption
is performed using Larry's public keys $V_i$ and $V_i'$ as follows.
\begin{itemize}
\item 
If $r_i=0$, $J_i$ is encrypted with $V_i$ and $K_i$ is encrypted with $V'_i$; 
the $i$-th triple is
\[
	T_i = (0, E(J_i,V_i), E(K_i,V'_i))\ .
\]
\item Otherwise (if $r_i=1$) the public keys are switched: 
$J_i$ is encrypted with $V_i'$ and $K_i$ is encrypted with $V_i$;
the $i$-th triple is
\[
	T_i = (1, E(J_i,V'_i), E(K_i,V_i))\ .
\]
\end{itemize}
Since each triple contains $r_i$, Larry knows which
way his public keys were used.  For each $i$, Larry can decrypt either
$J_i$ or $K_i$; he knows which he can decrypt and which he cannot.

This completes our description of a rather straightforward way to implement
non-interactive fractional oblivious transfer.

\heading{Why this works.} To see that this scheme works as advertised,
note that Alice sends Larry exactly $n$ triples, and that Larry can
decrypt exactly one ciphertext of each triple.  On the $i$-th triple,
if $a_i=0$, Larry gets either junk ($0$) or a key ($K_i$).  If
$a_i=1$, Larry either gets a jewel ($s+L_{i-1}$), or a key ($K_i$).
Larry knows whether he gets junk, a jewel, or a key, since he knows
$a_i$ and $r_i$.  Larry obtains $s$ if and only if he gets $t-1$ keys
followed by a jewel, for some $t$, $1\le t \le n$.  He can tell if he
is able to obtain $s$ or not.  Since succeeding in position $t$
happens only if $a_t=1$, and then only with probability $2^{-t}$,
Larry receives $s$ with probability exactly $p$, by
equation~(\ref{eq:pdef}).

\heading{Alice's random bits $r$.}  Note that as long as Larry chooses
which of each pair of public keys are good for him at random, then it
does not matter whether or not Alice chooses the bits $r_i$ randomly;
Larry has a chance of exactly $p$ of reading any particular message.

Similarly, as long as Alice chooses her bits $r$ at random, then Larry
will have a chance of exactly $p$ of reading any particular message,
even if Larry did not randomly decide which of each pair of public
keys would be good.

However, we observe that Alice can in principle, if she wishes, choose
her $r$ bits to be identical or correlated from message to message.
In some situations this might give her a perceived advantage, since
this might allow Larry to read all of a sequence of messages, or none
of them.  

To help ensure that Alice uses appropriate randomness, one could
require that Alice's random bits $r$ be determined in some fixed
manner, say by cycling sequentially through all possible values for
$r$, or by hashing (taking a message digest of) the first field (the
encrypted message $m$).  It is easy for Larry to determine whether or
not Alice is complying with this standard procedure.  The second procedure
is not perfect, since Alice can encrypt several variants of the same
message, and only transmit those with desired $r$ values, but this
approach may not help her, inasmuch as she doesn't know which keys are
good for Larry.

\subsection{The polynomial scheme}\label{sec-polyfot}

We now propose a different scheme in which Alice needs only a single
encryption (costing two exponentiations) in order to accomplish the
transfer, regardless of the value of $p$.

\heading{Preliminaries.} We consider a transfer probability of the
form $p=a/m$ where $a,m$ are integers satisfying $0<a\leq m$. (In the
binary scheme, $m=2^n$ was a power of two. Here we won't make this
restriction.)  The scheme is based, as before, on the hardness of
discrete logarithms, but this time in a group $G$ of prime order $q>m$
for which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. There are many ways
to get such groups. A simple, concrete implementation is to choose a
prime $\rho=2q+1$ where $q>m$ is also prime, and let $G$ be a subgroup
of order $q$ of $Z_\rho^*$.  (Specifically, we can fix and publicize
an element $\theta\in Z_\rho^*$ of order $q$, and let
$G=\langle\theta\rangle$ be the sub-group generated by $\theta$.
Under this implementation, the arithmetic operations are all in
$Z_\rho^*$, so have the usual costs.)

Notice that all non-trivial elements of $G$ are generators of $G$. We
let $g$ be a randomly chosen generator of $G$, so
$G=\iset{g^i}{i\in Z_q}$.  It is important for us that the index
set $Z_q$ is itself a field, which is why we chose $G$
to be of prime order $q$.  As before, we let $U\in G$ be an element
for which $\log_g(U)$ is unknown.  We let $\a_0=1\in Z_q$. We also fix
$m$ {\em distinct\/} elements $\a_1,\ldots,\a_{m}$ of
$Z_q^*-\{\a_0\}$.  (It must be that $\a_0=1$. But it does not matter
what $\a_1,\ldots,\a_m$ are as long as they are distinct, non-zero,
and non-one, and we suggest the reader think of them as
$2,3,\ldots,m+1$.  That $\a_0,\ldots,\a_m$ must be distinct is the
reason we have $q>m$.)  

The values $p$, $a$, $m$, $\rho$, $q$, $g$, and $\a_0,\ldots,\a_m$ are all
fixed and public.

\heading{The idea.} Before specifying the scheme, let us try to give a
brief, informal overview of the ideas.  Larry will form a public key
$V_1,\ldots, V_{m},W_0,\ldots,W_a$ consisting of $m+a+1$ elements of
$G$. The last $a+1$ elements will be used only by Alice to verify that
Larry's key is properly made.
Letting $x_i=\log_g(V_i)\in Z_q$ for $i=1,\ldots,m$, the key will be
chosen so that:
\begin{onelist}
\item Larry knows a random, size $a$ subset of $\{x_1,\ldots,x_m\}$.
\item There exists a degree $a$ polynomial $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots+
f_ax^a\in Z_q[x]$ such that
\begin{twolist}
\item $x_i=f(\a_i)$ for all $i=1,\ldots,m$, and
\item {\em Larry does not know $f$.}
\end{twolist}
\end{onelist}
Furthermore, this will be done in such a way that Alice can check the
property~(2). Now if Larry does not know $f$ then he cannot know
{\em more\/} than $a$ of the values $x_1,\ldots,x_{m}$ (otherwise
he could interpolate to find the coefficients of $f$). Thus, in fact,
he knows exactly $a$ of these values. Now to accomplish the transfer,
Alice can choose one key out of $V_1,\ldots,V_{m}$ at random, and use it
as before.  This calls, on the part of Alice, for only a single
encryption.

The problem is how to set up the constraints we have discussed.
Obviously we cannot have Larry choose $f$, since then he would know
it. Instead, we make Larry specify $W_0,\ldots,W_a$ in some particular
way, and then view the coefficients of the polynomial as {\em
implicitly\/} specified by $f_i =\log_g(W_i)$ for $i=0,\ldots,a$.
Furthermore, we will ensure (and Alice will check) that $W_0\cdot
W_1\cdots W_a=U$, which implies that Larry doesn't know all of
$f_0,\ldots,f_a$, and hence doesn't know $f$.  (In our scheme if Larry
is honest he will in fact know the discrete logs of none of the
$W_i$'s.)  Furthermore, Alice can verify item~(2.1) above using
a technique of Feldman \cite{Feldman87} and Pedersen
\cite{e91:pedersen1} used for verifiable secret sharing.

Larry will proceed by first specifying a random, size $a$ subset of
$V_1, \ldots,V_m$ in such a way that he knows the discrete logs of
these $a$ elements. Then, we will show how he can compute
$W_0,\ldots,W_a$ by a linear algebraic technique. Finally, he will use
these values to specify the remaining $m-a$ elements amongst
$V_1,\ldots,V_m$. Let us now describe the scheme in full.

\renewcommand{\arraystretch}{1.3} 

\heading{Key setup.} Larry chooses at random a size $a$ subset of $[m] = \{1,2,\ldots,m\}$. 
This choice can be thought of as specifying an injective map $\pi\Colon 
[a]\to [m]$, where $\pi(1),\ldots,\pi(a)$,
all distinct, are the $a$ chosen indices. He now chooses elements
$x_{\pi(1)},\ldots,x_{\pi(a)}\in Z_q$ at random and sets
\begin{equation}
  V_{\pi(l)} \eq g^{x_{\pi(l)}}\in G\hspace{20pt}\mbox{for $l=1, \ldots,a$}\;.
  \label{eq-chosenv}
\end{equation}
(This specifies $a$ of the elements $V_1, \ldots,V_m$ in such a way
that Larry knows their discrete logs.  The other $m-a$ still need to
be specified, in such a way that Larry doesn't know, and can't
compute, their discrete logs.) Now Larry defines the $a+1$ by $a+1$
Vandermonde matrix
\[  A \eq \left[  \begin{array}{ccccc}
 \a_0^0 & \a_0^1 &  \cdots & \a_0^{a} \\
 \a_{\pi(1)}^0 & \a_{\pi(1)}^1  & \cdots & \a_{\pi(1)}^{a} \\
  \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
 \a_{\pi(a)}^{0} & \a_{\pi(a)}^1 & \cdots & \a_{\pi(a)}^{a} 
           \end{array}\right]\;.
\]
Since $A$ is Vandermonde it is invertible. Larry computes its inverse
\[ B \eq A^{-1} \eq \left[  \begin{array}{cccc}
        \b_{0,0} & \b_{0,1} &  \cdots & \b_{0,{a}} \\
        \b_{1,0} & \b_{1,1} &  \cdots & \b_{1,{a}} \\
         \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
     \b_{{a},{0}} & \b_{{a},1} & \cdots & \b_{{a},{a}} 
                \end{array}\right]\;.
\]
The arithmetic here is over the field $Z_q$. (Notice that in saying this 
inverse exists and can be computed we need the fact that $Z_q$ is a field. 
This is why we choose $G$ to be of prime order $q$.) Larry now sets
\begin{eqnarray}
  W_0 & = & U^{\b_{0,0}}\cdot\sprod{l=1}{a} V_{\pi(l)}^{\b_{0,l}} \nonumber\\ 
  W_1 & = & U^{\b_{1,0}}\cdot\sprod{l=1}{a} V_{\pi(l)}^{\b_{1,l}} \nonumber\\
   {\vdots\hspace{8pt}} & & \hspace{30pt} \vdots  \label{eq-w} \\
  W_a & = & U^{\b_{a,0}}\cdot\sprod{l=1}{a} V_{\pi(l)}^{\b_{a,l}}\;,\nonumber
\end{eqnarray}
the arithmetic here being in $G$. (We will see that by doing this,
Larry has implicitly chosen the polynomial $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots
f_ax^a\in Z_q[x]$ where $f_i=\log_g(W_i)$. But Larry does not know
$f_0,\ldots,f_a$.) Now Larry specifies the remaining $V_i$'s as
follows--- he sets
\begin{equation}
  V_i \eq \sprod{j=0}{a} W_j^{\a_i^j} \hspace{20pt}
\mbox{for all $i\in [m]$ that are not in the range of $\pi$}\;,
                 \label{eq-otherv}
\end{equation}
the arithmetic being in $G$. Finally, Larry outputs $(V_1,\ldots,V_m,
W_0,\ldots,W_a)$ as his public key.

\heading{Properties of this key.} To better understand what follows,
it is worth saying something about what Larry accomplishes by the
above steps.  The following claim says that he is implicitly defining
the polynomial $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots+f_ax^a\in Z_q[x]$ by the matrix
equation \eqref{eq-f}, and that his key is related to this polynomial
as we would like.

\begin{claim}\label{cl-f} Suppose Larry follows the key generation procedure
described above. Define
\begin{equation}
  \left[\begin{array}{c}f_0 \\ f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_a\end{array}\right]
 \eq 
\left[  \begin{array}{cccc}
        \b_{0,0} & \b_{0,1} &  \cdots & \b_{0,{a}} \\
        \b_{1,0} & \b_{1,1} &  \cdots & \b_{1,{a}} \\
        \vdots & \vdots & \vdots  & \vdots \\
     \b_{{a},{0}} & \b_{{a},1}  & \cdots & \b_{{a},{a}} 
                \end{array}\right]
  \;
\left[\begin{array}{c}\log_g(U) \\ x_{\pi(1)} \\ \vdots \\ x_{\pi(a)}
     \end{array}\right]\;,
\label{eq-f}
\end{equation}
the arithmetic being in $Z_q$, and let $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots+f_ax^a\in 
Z_q[x]$. Then
\begin{newenum}
\item $\log_g(W_j)=f_j$ for all $j=0,\ldots,a$, and
\item $\log_g(V_i)=f(\a_i)$ for all $i=1,\ldots,m$, and, finally,
\item $f_0+f_1+\cdots+f_a=\log_g(U)$.
\end{newenum}
\end{claim}
The proof of this claim is in \apref{sec-proofs}.  Note that from item~(1)
we have $W_j=g^{f_j}$, and thus from item~(3) we have $W_0\cdot W_1\cdots
W_a=U$, which is the product constraint that Alice will check.

\heading{Verification.} Alice verifies the public key $(V_1,\ldots,V_m,
W_0,\ldots,W_a)$ as follows. First, she checks the size, namely that 
it really consists of $m$ elements of $G$ followed by another $a+1$ 
elements of $G$. Then she checks two things---
\begin{eqnarray}
   U & = & W_0\cdot W_1\cdots W_a \label{eq-checkprod} \\
  V_i & = & \sprod{j=0}{a} W_j^{\a_i^j}\hspace{20pt}\mbox{for all 
        $i=1,\ldots,m$}\;.\label{eq-checkpoly}
\end{eqnarray}
If these checks pass, she accepts the public key as valid. 

One can check that \clref{cl-f} implies that if Larry is honest then 
these checks do succeed. More important, however, is that even if
Larry is not honest, this verification guarantees Alices that
Larry will not receive the OT with probability {\em more\/}
than $p$. Why this is true is discussed below.

We note that Alice has to perform this verification step only once, no matter
how many messages she sends.

\heading{Transfer.} As we have already indicated, to perform the $p$-NFOT, 
Alice picks $i\in [m]$ at random, and uses $V_i$ as the key with which 
to encrypt her message $s\in G$. Namely, she picks $y\in Z_q$ at random and
sends $E(s,V_i)=(c_1,c_2)=(g^y,sV_i^y)$, the operations being in $G$.

\heading{Efficiency.} The key feature is that transfer needs only one
El Gamal encryption (which is two exponentiations), regardless of the
value of $p=a/m$. We pay for this in the size of the public file,
which is $O(k(m+a))$ where $k=|\rho|$ is the security parameter. (In
the binary scheme, it was $O(k\log_2(m))$.)  But this is not too
important. The public file is down-loaded once (or at not too frequent
intervals) and stored by Alice on her machine. The time needed to
compute a ciphertext and the size of the ciphertext don't depend on
the size of this file.

\heading{Security for Alice.} The verification is for Alice's
security; it is supposed to guarantee her that even if Larry is
dishonest, he won't get her data with probability more than $p$.  So
consider a Larry who tries to cheat. His goal is to somehow create the
public key so that he ends up knowing $\log_g(V_i)$ for more than $a$
values of $i\in [m]$. The following claim implies Larry cannot cheat in
this way.  To state it we first need some terminology. Given elements
$W_0,\ldots, W_a$ of $G$, we define the {\em polynomial defined by
$W_0,\ldots,W_a$} as $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots+f_ax^a$ where
$f_j=\log_g(W_j)$ for $j=0, \ldots,a$. Now, the following claim says that if
verification succeeds then exactly the same conditions as in
\clref{cl-f} hold with respect to the polynomial defined by Larry's
public key, even if Larry had tried to cheat.

\begin{claim}\label{cl-verify} Suppose Alice's verification of key $(V_1,
\ldots,V_m,W_0,\ldots,W_a)$ is successful, and let $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots
+f_ax^a\in Z_q[x]$ be the polynomial defined by $W_0,\ldots,W_a$. 
Then
\begin{newenum}
\item $\log_g(W_j)=f_j$ for all $j=0,\ldots,a$, and
\item $\log_g(V_i)=f(\a_i)$ for all $i=1,\ldots,m$, and, finally,
\item $f_0+f_1+\cdots+f_a=\log_g(U)$.
\end{newenum}
\end{claim}
The proof is in \apref{sec-proofs}.  In consequence of item~(3), Larry can
know at most $a$ of the values $f_0,\ldots, f_a$, not matter how he
plays, because otherwise he would know $\log_g(U)$. Intuitively, this
means he doesn't know $f$.  But now, from item~(2), it follows that Larry
can know at most $a$ of the values $\log_g(V_1),\ldots,\log_g(V_m)$. 
This, intuitively, means that Larry cannot receive the transfer with 
probability higher than $a/m=p$. Notice that Alice's security
depends on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem
for Larry.

\heading{Security for Larry.} We want to argue that we have security
for Larry, meaning that Alice doesn't know which subset of $a$ out 
of $n$ keys is the one for which Larry knows the discrete logs.

\begin{claim}\label{cl-larry} Suppose Larry uses the procedure prescribed
above to construct his public key $(V_1,\allowbreak \ldots,\allowbreak
V_m,\allowbreak W_0,\allowbreak \ldots,W_a)$.
Then the distribution on this key is the same as if the key were
generated by the following experiment:
\begin{newenum}
\item Pick $f_0,\ldots,f_a\in Z_q$ at random subject to $f_0+f_1+\cdots+
f_a=\log_g(U)$,
\item Let $f(x)=f_0+f_1x+\cdots+f_ax^a\in Z_q[x]$,
\item For $i=1,\ldots,m$ let $V_i=g^{f(\a_i)}$,
\item For $j=0,\ldots,a$ let $W_j=g^{f_j}$, and 
\item Output $(V_1,\ldots,V_m,W_0,\ldots,W_a)$.
\end{newenum}
\end{claim}
The proof of \clref{cl-larry} is in \apref{sec-proofs}. Now, clearly,
presented with a key from this distribution, Alice has no idea of what
Larry knows about the $\log_g(V_i)$'s, even if she can compute
discrete logs.

Based on this, one can argue that there is no ``key-choosing''
strategy for Alice under which her transfer probability is reduced
below $p$.  By this we mean the following. Suppose that instead of
using a random $V_i$ as key, Alice chooses, somehow, probabilities
$p_1,\ldots,p_m$ summing to $1$, and transfers as follows--- she picks
$i\in [m]$ according to the distribution $\Pr[i=j]=p_j$ for all $j\in
[m]$, and then uses $V_i$ as the key. (If she is honest, $p_j=1/m$ for
all $j\in [m]$.) Then her transfer probability is still $p$,
regardless of the values of $p_1,\ldots,p_m$.

As for the binary scheme, it may be simplest to specify that Alice's
``random'' choices are to be made in a specific manner, say by cycling
through all values.

\section{Discussion and Variations}

\headingg{Set-up.}
Note that Alice needs {\em no} ``set-up'' to follow the translucent
cryptography protocol.  She does not need to be a registered user,
have any private keys escrowed, etc.

\heading{Efficiency.}  With the proposal of \secref{sec-polyfot}
described above, Alice needs to perform $2$ modular exponentiations
(one El Gamal encryption) in order to compute the desired LEAF.  An
implementation can, if it wishes, precompute future session keys and
their associated LEAFs as a means of decreasing the latency in
encrypting a new message. 

\heading{The value of $p$.}  The value of $p$ that is effective is the
value of $p$ that is embedded in Alice's translucent cryptography
implementation.

Different categories of equipment could have different probabilities
$p$.  For example, software and hardware that are exported could have
$p=1$, while domestic versions could have $p=0.02$.

Larry can monitor whether or not Alice is using the correct value of
$p$, by monitoring what fraction of the time he actually succeeds in
getting $s$.


\heading{Warrants.}
To ensure that Larry must get a warrant in order to decrypt his
allowed fraction of the translucent crypto, the value transmitted
obliviously should be the message key $s$ encrypted with the public
key of Jerry (the judge), or his designated agent who can be
available in real-time to decrypt LEAFs.  
This encrypted block could also include the ID
of the software or hardware generating the message, if the search
warrant is to be restricted to messages from a single source.

\heading{Multiple agencies and multiple probabilities}
The LEAF could easily contain messages for two or more agencies that
need to cooperate to get the final message key.  Larry might receive
message key $s_1$ encrypted with his public key, and Louis (who works
for another organization) might receive message key $s_2$, encrypted
with his public key.  The actual message key $s$ might be the sum (or
the exclusive-or) of $s_1$ and $s_2$.

Differing agencies could even receive the message key with different
probabilities.  The FBI might receive the message key with probability
$0.02$, whereas an escrow agent of the user's choice might receive the
message key with probability $1$.

Stewart Baker (in a private communication that was probably intended
to tease the authors) suggested that law enforcement
might find this proposal more attractive if it were implemented in a
related variant, making 1\% of the messages accessible to law
enforcement (without even a warrant(!). Another 20\% or so of the
messages would become accessible if suspicious activity is detected in
the first 1\%, and the remainder would become available to law
enforcement with a court order.  It is straightforward to implement
such a variation based on our ideas.  (It is not so easy, fortunately,
to get around the Constitution!)

\heading{Export.}
Of course, non-U.S. companies may object to Larry accessing their
communications, whether this access was obtained through key escrow or
through translucent cryptography.  Translucent cryptography is likely
to fare no better in an international market than key escrow fares.

On the other hand, it is easy, for example, for U.S. manufacturers to
develop products (say for France) that give U.S. access with
probability $0.5$ and the French government access with probability
$1.0$.  This would merely require the use of two LEAF fields, one
for each government.

\heading{The opening problem.} A weakness of our implementations,
inherited from a weakness of non-interactive oblivious transfer, is
that in some circumstances, if Larry does excercise his privilage and
decrypt the fraction $p$ of Alice's traffic to which he is entitled,
Alice may learn some information about Larry's secret key which would
enable her, in future, to decrease the probability that Larry recovers
her messages.  This happens if Larry not only decrypts, but also
reveals {\em which\/} ciphertexts he decrypted. (As long as Larry
keeps secret the decrypted information, nothing is revealed.)  For
this reason it may be desirable for Larry to have many public keys,
with different keys used in different programs, different devices, or
products produced in different months.  Let us explain this issue by
example.

Say we are using the polynomial scheme, and Larry's public key is $(V_1,V_2,
V_3,W_0,W_1)$, and Larry knows $\log_g(V_1)=x_1$. (The transfer probability 
here is $p=1/3$.) Thus, Larry's secret key consists of two things: a secret
index, namely $1$, saying which of the three keys is a ``receiving'' one
for Larry, and the value $x_1$, which enables the actual receipt. Larry's
security relies on the fact that Alice does not know his secret index;
if she did, she could encrypt using only the other keys, and Larry
would never be able to recover the message.

Now suppose Alice encrypts 5 messages, and her choices of keys are
$V_2,V_1,V_2,V_3,V_2$. Suppose Larry decides to wiretap.  He will
obtain the second message.  A priori Alice does not know which message
Larry got. But suppose now she learns, somehow, that Larry got the
second message. Then she knows that Larry knows $\log_g(V_1)$, because
$V_1$ was the key she used in the second message. Thus she has
determined Larry's secret index. Now she can fool him; in future, she
will never use key $V_1$.

How could Alice learn which ciphertext Larry decrypted? The issue is
how wiretap information is used. We expect that often Larry wiretaps
for his own information; the recovered plaintexts are not revealed to
the public. In such a case, Alice, or other users, learn nothing about
Larry's secret index. But suppose Larry needs to use the wiretap
information, say as evidence in a court case. The plaintexts are then
revealed, and, by their examination, Alice can determine which of her
messages were decrypted. This tells her what is Larry's secret index.

The extent to which this is a problem thus depends on the extent to
which Larry intends to publicize information obtained by wiretaps.
Since this must happen to some extent, we need to mitigate its
effects. Our suggestion, as indicated above, is that Larry have
many public keys, with different keys used in different programs
or devices at different times.

For the benefit of a reader familiar with non-interactive oblivious
transfer (NIOT), let us add some historical notes and comparison.  The
underlying issue of revelation of the secret index of a recipient in a
NIOT based on some action of the recipient arose, and was recognized,
in the context of implementing non-interactive zero-knowledge based on
NIOT \cite{BellareMi90a}.  There the problem was that if the sender
learned that her proof had been rejected then the receiver's secret
index would leak. The suggestion of \cite{BellareMi90a} to overcome
this was to change the public key when a proof was rejected. But this
is not too practical, because the sender can {\em force\/} revelation
by sending bad proofs. (This issue, and attacks based on it, have been
discussed a few times in the literature.) In comparison, in
translucent cryptography, there is much less of a problem, because it
is much harder to force Larry to reveal which ciphertexts he
decrypted. Thus, our suggestion above, that Larry have many different
public keys, seems to provide an acceptable resolution to this
``opening'' problem in this context.

\heading{Other ways of getting around these schemes.}
With sufficient work, these schemes, like other proposals, are easy to
get around.  Two particularly relevant references are Wyner's papers on the
``wire-tap channel'' \cite{Wyner75,OzarowWy85}.  Superencryption also
defeats this approach, of course; these sorts of ``work-arounds'' on
the part of a user are problems common to any such proposal for
government access to messages.

\heading{Why NIOT?} A reader may ask why NIOT is used at
all. Specifically, how about the following instead? Let Larry publicize a
public key of a conventional public key cryptosystem such as RSA, and
let $\calE$ denote encryption under this key. (Larry knows the
corresponding decryption key.)  When Alice is to send a message $m$ to
Bob, she picks, as before, a session key $s$, uses it to produce the
first field (F1) as described in \secref{sec-tc}. The second field too
is as before. She now lets $s^*$ equal $s$ with probability $p$, and
$0$ otherwise. She then lets the LEAF be $\calE(s^*)$. Larry can
access the LEAF, and has $s$ a fraction $p$ of the time.

This is certainly much simpler than NIOT. But the problem is that it
puts greater trust in Alice. Alice could cheat very easily, and yet
evade detection. For example, whenever $m$ is an ``important'' message
she would choose $s^*=0$, and otherwise choose $s^*=s$, doing this in
such a way that she chooses $s^*=s$ a fraction $p$ of the time. Then
Larry gets only the unimportant stuff, but, because he is getting a
fraction $p$ of the plaintexts, he can't really complain.  In contrast,
in NIOT, there is no key-choosing strategy for Alice which lowers the
transfer probability below $p$.

All implementations, whether of key escrow or translucent cryptography
such as we discuss, rely on some trust in Alice. The question is the
{\em degree\/} of this trust. Our goal is to make it as hard as
possible for Alice to cheat. As discussed above, there will always be
ways around the schemes; but let us not make it {\em too\/} easy.

\heading{Comparison with key escrow.}
The approach proposed has the following 
advantages over key-escrow schemes:
\begin{namelist}{A}
\item Set-up is particular easy with our scheme; there is no escrow
      procedure required of users or manufacturers.  We feel that this 
      is a very significant advantage of our proposal.
\item There are no escrow agents holding users' keys, who might be
      tempted (or ordered) to abuse users' privacy.  In our scheme,
      the corresponding agents are those parties holding the private
      keys corresponding to the published public keys.
\item There is a firm upper bound on the extent to which law enforcement
      can encroach on individual privacy; a certain fraction of Alice's
      messages will be private from everyone except their intended 
      recipients.
\item There is a firm lower bound on the extent to which cryptography
      will prevent authorized wiretapping from being effective; a certain
      fraction of Alice's messages will be wire-tappable (on the average).
\item The scheme contains a variable-access rate $p$ that may be changed
      according to the specific use or the perceived risks.
\item Compliance with the scheme can be monitored.
\item The scheme can be easily elaborated or combined with other approaches 
      to meet more detailed requirements.
\end{namelist}
\medskip

\noindent
Our scheme has the following possible disadvantages:
\begin{namelist}{D}
\item Law enforcement may be frustrated that when it has an authorized
wiretap, it is not getting decryption of {\em all} of the messages. (Too bad;
that is the nature of the compromise proposed here.)
\item Individuals may be frustrated that this scheme does not provide
absolute privacy for their messages; law enforcement can read some fraction
of their messages.  (Too bad; that is the nature of the compromise
proposed here.)
\end{namelist}

\heading{Related work.} Upton \cite{Upton93} has suggested using {\em
interactive\/} oblivious transfer as a replacement for key escrow.  In
his suggestion, every time Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, she
must first communicate with Larry, engaging in an oblivious transfer
protocol in which she transfers to Larry either the session key or a
random string, she doesn't know which. But this means Larry must
actively participate in every communications session, which 
creates some significant practical problems.


\section{Open Questions}

Can one build an efficient non-interactive fractional oblivious
transfer scheme based on RSA or the Rabin function rather than on the
Diffie-Hellman assumption?

\section{Conclusions}

We have presented a novel alternative to standard key escrow schemes,
that may allow a generally acceptable compromise to be reached on a
difficult issue of national cryptographic policy. We have proposed an
efficient implementation of it, based on a primitive that may be of
independent interest.

\section*{Acknowledgments}

We thank Stewart Baker, Tony Eng, Rosario Gennaro, Oded Goldreich, and
Burt Kaliski for helpful comments and suggestions.

% Crepeau moved to ``paper.bib'' to avoid getting wrong paper out of crypto:

\ifnum\mihir=1
\bibliography{paper,crypto,asiacrypt,eurocrypt,focs}
\else
\bibliography{/u/rivest/papers/translucent/paper,/u/rivest/papers/crypto,/u/rivest/papers/asiacrypt,/u/rivest/papers/eurocrypt,/u/rivest/papers/focs}
\fi

\appendix

\section{Proofs of Claims}\label{sec-proofs}

\begin{proof}[\clref{cl-f}] From \eqref{eq-f} we have
\begin{equation}
   f_j \eq \b_{j,0}\log_g(U)+\ssum{l=1}{a}\b_{j,l}x_{\pi(l)}\hspace{20pt}
    \mbox{for $j=0,\ldots,a$}\;.
\label{eq-fe}
\end{equation}
Now {from} \eqref{eq-w} we have
\begin{eqnarray*}
 \log_g(W_j) & = & \log_g\left(U^{\b_{j,0}}\cdot\sprod{l=1}{a}
     V_{\pi(l)}^{\b_{j,l}}\right) \\
 & = & \b_{j,0}\log_g(U)+\ssum{l=1}{a}\b_{j,l}\log_g(V_{\pi(l)}) \\
 & = & \b_{j,0}\log_g(U)+\ssum{l=1}{a}\b_{j,l}x_{\pi(l)} \\
 & = & f_j \;,
\end{eqnarray*}
proving item~(1) of the claim. (Here we used \eqref{eq-chosenv},
namely the fact that $V_{\pi(l)}=g^{x_{\pi(l)}}$ by definition.) Now,
multiply both sides of \eqref{eq-f} by the matrix $A$, and use the
fact that $AB=I$, to get
\[
\left[  \begin{array}{cccc}
 \a_0^0 & \a_0^1 & \cdots & \a_0^{a} \\
 \a_{\pi(1)}^0 & \a_{\pi(1)}^1  & \cdots & \a_{\pi(1)}^{a} \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots  & \vdots \\
 \a_{\pi(a)}^{0} & \a_{\pi(a)}^1  & \cdots & 
  \a_{\pi(a)}^{a} 
                \end{array}\right]
  \;
  \left[\begin{array}{c}f_0 \\ f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_a\end{array}\right]
 \eq 
\left[\begin{array}{c}\log_g(U) \\ x_{\pi(1)} \\ \vdots \\ x_{\pi(a)}
     \end{array}\right]\;.
\]
In other words,
\begin{eqnarray}
  \ssum{l=0}{a}\a_0^lf_l & = & \log_g(U) \label{eq-feif} \\
  \ssum{l=0}{a}\a_{\pi(j)}^lf_l & = & x_{\pi(j)}\hspace{20pt}\mbox{for
   $j=1,\ldots,a$}\;. \label{eq-feis}
\end{eqnarray}
But recall that $\a_0=1$. Thus \eqref{eq-feif} directly gives us item~(3)
of the claim. Furthermore, note that \eqref{eq-feis} is the same as
\[  f(\a_{\pi(j)}) \eq x_{\pi(j)}\hspace{20pt}\mbox{for
   $j=1,\ldots,a$}\;,
\]
which establishes item~(2) for all $i$ in the range of $\pi$. Now we must
check item~(2) for $i$ not in the range of $\pi$. For these $i$ we know
that $V_i$ is defined by \eqref{eq-otherv}. Taking discrete logs 
of both sides of that equation we have
\[  \log_g(V_i)  \eq \log_g\left(\sprod{j=0}{a} W_j^{\a_i^j}\right) \eq
     \ssum{j=0}{a}\a_i^j\log_g(W_j) \eq \ssum{j=0}{a}\a_i^jf_j \eq
   f(\a_i)\;,
\]
as desired. This completes the proof.
\end{proof}

\noindent
Now, we would like to discuss the security.  Refer to 
\secref{sec-polyfot} for the definition of the polynomial defined by
some elements of $G$.

\begin{proof}[\clref{cl-verify}] Item~(1) is a tautology. Taking discrete
logs of both sides of \eqref{eq-checkpoly} gives
\[  \log_g(V_i)  \eq \log_g\left(\sprod{j=0}{a} W_j^{\a_i^j}\right) \eq
     \ssum{j=0}{a}\a_i^j\log_g(W_j) \eq  \ssum{j=0}{a}\a_i^jf_j 
     \eq f(\a_i)\;,
\]
establishing item~(2). Finally, taking discrete logs of both sides of 
\eqref{eq-checkprod} proves item~(3).
\end{proof}

\begin{proof}[\clref{cl-larry}] Fix the map $\pi$ chosen by Larry. Now
let $f_0,\ldots,f_a\in Z_q$ be arbitrary subject to their sum being
$\log_g(U)$. We argue that there is a unique choice of $x_{\pi(1)},
\ldots,x_{\pi(a)}\in Z_q$ such that \eqref{eq-f} holds, namely
\begin{equation}
\left[\begin{array}{c} x_{\pi(1)} \\ \vdots \\ x_{\pi(a)}
     \end{array}\right] \eq
\left[  \begin{array}{cccc}
 \a_{\pi(1)}^0 & \a_{\pi(1)}^1  & \cdots & \a_{\pi(1)}^{a} \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots  & \vdots \\
 \a_{\pi(a)}^{0} & \a_{\pi(a)}^1  & \cdots & 
  \a_{\pi(a)}^{a} 
                \end{array}\right]
  \;
  \left[\begin{array}{c}f_0 \\ f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_a\end{array}\right]\;.
\label{eq-dist}
\end{equation}
To see that this choice makes \eqref{eq-f} hold, first note that since
$\a_0=1$ and $f_0+\cdots+f_a=\log_g(U)$ we have
\[
\left[\begin{array}{c} \log_g(U) \\ x_{\pi(1)} \\ \vdots \\ x_{\pi(a)}
     \end{array}\right] \eq
\left[  \begin{array}{cccc}
 \a_0^0 & \a_0^1 & \cdots & \a_0^{a} \\
 \a_{\pi(1)}^0 & \a_{\pi(1)}^1  & \cdots & \a_{\pi(1)}^{a} \\
 \vdots & \vdots & \vdots  & \vdots \\
 \a_{\pi(a)}^{0} & \a_{\pi(a)}^1  & \cdots & 
  \a_{\pi(a)}^{a} 
                \end{array}\right]
  \;
  \left[\begin{array}{c}f_0 \\ f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_a\end{array}\right]\;,
\]
and now multiplying both sides by $B$ yields \eqref{eq-f}. On the other
hand the choice of \eqref{eq-dist} is unique because multiplying both
sides of \eqref{eq-f} by $A$ recovers it.

This means that for any fixed $\pi$, any vector $f_0,\ldots,f_a$ with
$f_0+\cdots+f_a=\log_g(U)$ has the same probability of being defined
by Larry's choices in his key construction process. Since the
other quantities, namely $V_1,\ldots,V_m,W_0,\ldots,W_a$, are
uniquely defined given $f_0,\ldots,f_a$, we have established
\clref{cl-larry}.
\end{proof}

\end{document}


